No. 25-3965

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES H. KLEIN, JR.;

Annette Klein; Eric Havens; Shandra Havens,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE;

Mary Mitchell, Postmaster, Georgetown Post Office, in her official capacity; Terrence Maney, Post Office Operations Manager, in his official capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

BRETT A. SHUMATE

Assistant Attorney General

DOMINICK S. GERACE II

United States Attorney

CHARLES W. SCARBOROUGH DOUGLAS C. DREIER

Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7264

U.S. Department of Justice

950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530

(202) 514-4452

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

DESIGNATION OF RELEVANT DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:                                                                                                                          Page(s)

Axon Enter., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n,

598 U.S. 175 (2023)......................................................................... 13, 16, 17, 24, 27

Bovard v. U.S. Post Off., No. 94-6360,

1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3846 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 1995)....................................... 8, 16

Elgin v. Department of the Treasury,

567 U.S. 1 (2012)....................................................................... 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24

Enterprise, Inc. v. Bolger,

774 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1985)............................................................................................................................. 15

Erickson v. U.S. Post Off.,

250 F. App’x 757 (8th Cir. 2007)....................................................................... 15-16

Foster v. Pitney Bowes Corp.,

549 F. App’x 982 (Fed. Cir. 2013)................................................................. 8, 15, 22

Franchise Tax Bd. v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

467 U.S. 512 (1984)................................................................................................................................ 3

Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Acct. Oversight Bd.,

561 U.S. 477 (2010)............................................................................................................................. 26

GameFly, Inc. v. Postal Regul. Comm’n,

704 F.3d 145 (D.C. Cir. 2013)......................................................... 17, 18, 20, 24, 26

Golden v. Commissioner,

548 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 2008)............................................................................................................................. 23

Heckler v. Ringer,

466 U.S. 602 (1984)............................................................................................................................. 19

Hollander v. U.S. Postal Serv., Civ. A. No. 88-2497,

1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14370 (D. Mass. Dec. 20, 1988)............................................................................................................................. 23

Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wilkerson,

910 F.3d 254 (6th Cir. 2018)............................................................................................................................. 23

LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

450 F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 2006).......................................................... 8, 9, 16, 21, 22, 27

National Ass’n of Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

462 U.S. 810 (1983)................................................................................................ 3

National Easter Seal Soc’y for Crippled Child. & Adults v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

656 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1981)................................................................................. 3

Pep-Wku LLC v. U.S. Postal Serv., Civ. A. No. 20-0009,

2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76257, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 2020)........................ 22, 23

Pontefract v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 23-3142, 2024 WL 5055838 (3d Cir. Dec. 10, 2024),

petition for cert. filed, No. 25-6737 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2025).................................... 8, 15, 22

Powell v. U.S. Postal Serv., Civ. A. No. 15-12913,

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12175 (D. Mass. Feb. 2, 2016)................................... 22-23

Rapid Enters., LLC v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 24-4041,

2025 WL 1644543 (10th Cir. June 10, 2025)........................................................ 15

Sissel v. Wormuth,

77 F.4th 941 (D.C. Cir. 2023)............................................................................... 24

Susselman v. Washtenaw Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,

109 F.4th 864 (6th Cir. 2024)................................................................................ 12

Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,

510 U.S. 200 (1994)......................................................................... 11, 16, 17, 18, 21

Torp v. United States, No. 21-1422,

2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 2824 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2022)......... 1, 8, 10, 13, 14, 17, 22, 27

U.S. Postal Serv. v. Konan,

146 S. Ct. 736 (2026).............................................................................................. 2

U.S. Postal Serv. v. Postal Regul. Comm’n,

747 F.3d 906 (D.C. Cir. 2014)........................................................................... 18, 20

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,

528 U.S. 562 (2000).............................................................................................. 17

White v. U.S. Post Off., No. 23-1239,

2024 WL 2973705 (10th Cir. June 13, 2024)............................................... 15, 21, 27

Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Tr. Co.,

379 U.S. 411...................................................................................................... 13, 21

U.S. Constitution:

Art. I, § 8, cl. 7.................................................................................................................................. 17

Amend. V.................................................................................................................................. 15

Statutes:

Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act,

Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198 (2006)................................................................................................................................ 4

Postal Reorganization Act,

Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (1970)................................................................................................................................ 3

5 U.S.C. § 706.................................................................................................................................... 5

28 U.S.C. § 1291.................................................................................................................................... 2

28 U.S.C. § 1331.................................................................................................................................... 2

28 U.S.C. § 1343.................................................................................................................................... 2

28 U.S.C. § 2112.................................................................................................................................... 5

28 U.S.C. § 2201.................................................................................................................................... 2

39 U.S.C. § 403.............................................................. 1, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 20, 22, 27

39 U.S.C. § 410.................................................................................................................................... 3

39 U.S.C. § 501........................................................................................................ 4, 26

39 U.S.C. § 503.......................................................................................................... 4, 5

39 U.S.C. § 504.................................................................................................................................... 5

39 U.S.C. § 3662...................................................... 4, 5, 7, 10, 13, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27

39 U.S.C. § 3663......................................................................... 5, 10, 13, 16, 18, 20, 25

39 U.S.C. § 3664.................................................................................................................................... 6

Regulations:

39 C.F.R. § 3010.106................................................................................................. 4, 5

39 C.F.R. § 3022.13.................................................................................................................................. 20

39 C.F.R. §§ 3022.1-3022.50.................................................................................................................................. 20

39 C.F.R. §§ 3023.10-3023.12.................................................................................................................................. 20

Rule:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12.................................................................................................................................... 9

Legislative Materials:

116 Cong. Rec. 21709 (1970)...................................................................................... 3

H.R. Rep. No. 91-1104 (1970).................................................................................... 3

H.R. Rep. No. 109-66, pt. 1 (2005)............................................................................. 4

S. Rep. No. 108-318 (2004)......................................................................................... 4

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs have requested oral argument. The government believes this is an appropriate case to resolve on the briefs, but we stand ready to present argument if the Court determines that it would facilitate consideration of the issues.

INTRODUCTION

Congress anticipated that the United States Postal Service, as one of the largest employers in the country and as a frequent point of contact for Americans across the nation, will receive numerous complaints concerning the delivery of mail, including claims of discrimination in mail services. To ensure accountability while avoiding inundating district courts with such claims, Congress directed those claims to an independent agency, the Postal Regulatory Commission (Commission), with judicial review of the Commission’s orders available in the D.C. Circuit.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that, if they brought a claim under the statute Congress enacted to address discrimination in mail services, 39 U.S.C. § 403(c), the district court would lack subject-matter jurisdiction over their complaint. Plaintiffs nevertheless assert that they may avoid the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction by bringing a “class of one” claim under the Equal Protection Clause that likewise alleges discrimination in mail services. That is wrong. As this Court emphasized in Torp v.

United States, No. 21-1422, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 2824, at *5-7 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2022) (unpublished), plaintiffs cannot circumvent the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction by such artful pleading. Their claim is, at bottom, a claim of discrimination in mail services, which is precisely the type of claim Congress intended to go to the Postal Regulatory Commission, with appellate review in the D.C. Circuit. The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Plaintiffs invoked the district court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 2201. Am. Compl., R.13, PageID # 49. The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss on October 27, 2025. Op., R.21, PageID # 95; J., R.22, PageID # 96. Plaintiffs timely appealed on December 9, 2025. Notice of Appeal, R.23, PageID # 97. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The question presented is whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims pertaining to discrimination in mail services for lack of jurisdiction because the Postal Regulatory Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.            Statutory Background

The United States Postal Service “is a frequent point of contact between citizens and the Federal Government.” U.S. Postal Serv. v. Konan, 146 S. Ct. 736, 740 (2026). “In 2024, the Postal Service’s more than 600,000 employees delivered more than 112 billion pieces of mail—over 300 million a day—to more than 165 million delivery points.” Id. “Unsurprisingly, given this volume, not all mail arrives” in the way a homeowner may want. Id. And equally unsurprisingly, this leads to hundreds of thousands of complaints against the Postal Service each year. See id. (“The Postal Service reports receiving approximately 335,000 customer complaints per year.”).

In 1970, in response to a “growing awareness” that the “vast sprawling postal complex” had become “overburdened” and was “in deep trouble,” H.R. Rep.

No. 91‑1104, at 4 (1970), Congress passed the Postal Reorganization Act, “[t]o improve and modernize” the postal system, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719, 719 (1970). The Act “abolished the Post Office Department, which since 1789 had administered the Nation’s mails” and established two new entities: “the United States Postal Service” and what was then called the “Postal Rate Commission.” National Ass’n of Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810, 813 (1983).

Congress “wished the Postal Service to be run more like a business than had its predecessor, the Post Office Department,” Franchise Tax Bd. v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

467 U.S. 512, 519-20 (1984), recognizing that “[d]elivering the mail is simply not in the same category of policymaking and program-development” as other government programs but rather “is an essential, business-oriented service,” National Easter Seal Soc’y for Crippled Child. & Adults v. U.S. Postal Serv., 656 F.2d 754, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting 116 Cong. Rec. 21709 (1970) (statement of Sen. McGee)). Accordingly, Congress established the Postal Service as an independent establishment of the executive branch that acts as a Government-owned corporation, and it made the Postal Service exempt from review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See

39 U.S.C. § 410(a); see also 116 Cong. Rec. 21709 (statement of Sen. McGee).

Congress also established a new Postal Rate Commission that was empowered to review the Postal Service’s rates and fees but was otherwise “limited” in its

“authority to exercise oversight over the Postal Service.” S. Rep. No. 108-318, at 6 (2004). Congress subsequently expanded the Commission’s role by creating a successor Postal Regulatory Commission with “enhanced authority to respond to complaints of pricing, service, or other actions by the Postal Service in violation of law” and “to correct violations by ordering the Postal Service to take whatever steps the Commission considers appropriate.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-66, pt. 1, at 52 (2005); see Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-435, § 601(a)(1),

120 Stat. 3198, 3238-39 (2006).

The Postal Regulatory Commission “is an independent establishment of the executive branch of the Government of the United States,” 39 U.S.C. § 501, which Congress has authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and establish procedures deemed necessary and proper to carry out its functions, id. § 503. Any interested person who believes the Postal Service is not operating in conformance with various requirements—including the requirement not to discriminate in the provision of mail services—may lodge a complaint with the Postal Regulatory Commission. Id.

§ 3662(a); see also id. § 403(c). The Commission may designate a Commissioner or member of the Commission’s staff to serve as the presiding officer for a specific proceeding. 39 C.F.R. § 3010.106(a). The presiding officer may: regulate the course of a proceeding before the Commission, including ruling on all matters not specifically reserved for the Commission, either orally during a hearing or by issuing

written rulings; administer oaths and affirmations; rule upon offers of proof and

receive relevant evidence; take or authorize that depositions be taken; hold appropriate conferences before or during hearings, including prehearing conferences; dispose of procedural requests; and take other actions necessary or appropriate to the discharge of their duties.          Id. § 3010.106(c). A majority of the Commissioners may also vote to “issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and presentation of testimony by, or the production of documentary or other evidence in the possession of, any covered person.” 39 U.S.C. § 504(f)(2)(A). A “covered person” is “an officer, employee, agent, or contractor of the Postal Service.” Id. § 504(f)(4). The actions of the Commission are not subject “to any change or supervision by the Postal Service.” Id. § 503. Within 90 days of the filing of a complaint, the Commission must either “find[] that such complaint raises material issues of fact or law” and “begin proceedings on such complaint” or else it must dismiss the complaint. Id.

§ 3662(b)(1)(A).

Decisions by the Commission are subject to judicial review. 39 U.S.C. § 3663. Specifically, any “person, including the Postal Service, adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Postal Regulatory Commission may, within 30 days after such order or decision becomes final, institute proceedings for review thereof by filing a petition in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.”

Id. The D.C. Circuit “shall review the order or decision in accordance with

section 706 of title 5 [i.e., the Administrative Procedure Act], and chapter 158 and section 2112 of title 28, on the basis of the record before the Commission.” Id.

District courts have no role in this scheme, but they have limited “jurisdiction specifically to enforce, and to enjoin and restrain the Postal Service from violating, any order issued by the Postal Regulatory Commission.” Id. § 3664.

B.           Factual Background

Plaintiffs Charles and Annette Klein and plaintiffs Eric and Shandra Havens are neighbors who live on Hillman Ridge Road in Georgetown, Ohio. Am. Compl., R.13, PageID # 49. Both sets of neighbors seek a mailbox placement where their property lines meet Hillman Ridge Road. Id. Hillman Ridge Road “is a single lane road.” Id., PageID # 50. In April 2015, the Postal Service approved Charles Klein’s request to place his mailbox at the end of his driveway. Id.

In October 2017, the Postal Service stopped delivery of mail to the Kleins’ and Havenses’ property line. Plaintiffs allege that the Postal Service stopped delivering mail to their property line after an incident that a mail carrier experienced while delivering mail to the Kleins’ house. Their complaint refers to a dispute with a former neighbor, who is not a party to this lawsuit, but who allegedly suffered damage to her vehicle when trying to drive around a mail carrier on the narrow, single-lane Hillman Ridge Road. See Am. Compl., R.13, PageID # 50 (“It’s because of the width of the road, which is a single lane road and the carrier has been having trouble going down that driveway. Well he meets another neighbor down there and they’d get a big fight and nobody will back up … and neighbor went around [the carrier], scratched her car

on a tree branch … then try to give us [i.e., the Postal Service] the bill … .” (cleaned

up)). The complaint nevertheless alleges that “[i]t is unknown to Plaintiffs why the Defendants will not deliver mail to the Plaintiffs’ properties.” Id., PageID # 53.

The Kleins and Havenses may still retrieve mail by going 0.4 miles up the road and may retrieve parcels that do not fit in his mailbox by going 5 miles into Georgetown, Ohio (10 miles roundtrip). Am. Compl., R.13, PageID # 51.

C.            Prior Proceedings

After the Postal Service stopped delivering mail to their properties, plaintiffs sued in district court. Plaintiffs’ complaint has just one cause of action, styled as a “Deprivation of Plaintiffs’ Right to ‘Class of One’ Equal Protection.” Am. Compl., R.13, PageID # 53. They seek a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from violating their purported “rights to receive [United States Postal Service] mail delivery at their properties,” a declaratory judgment “establishing the Plaintiffs’ right under law to receive [Postal Service] mail delivery at their properties,” and attorneys’ fees and costs. Id.

Defendants moved to dismiss. After full briefing, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Op., R.21, PageID # 95. The court “conclude[d] that Plaintiffs’ complaint about the Postal Service concerning mail delivery, or the lack thereof, is a service complaint, and thus exclusive jurisdiction over the complaint lies in the Postal Regulatory Commission” pursuant to 39 U.S.C.

§ 3662(a). Id., PageID # 90.

The district court cited numerous decisions holding that the Postal Regulatory Commission’s jurisdiction (and that of its predecessor) is exclusive. These included decisions from five circuit courts, including an unpublished decision of this Court, that all held that district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims with respect to the delivery of mail, as those claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Postal Regulatory Commission (or its predecessor). Op., R.21, PageID # 89-92 (first citing LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2006); then citing Pontefract v.

Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 23-3142, 2024 WL 5055838, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 10, 2024) (per curiam) (unpublished), petition for cert. filed, No. 25-6737 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2025); then citing Foster v. Pitney Bowes Corp., 549 F. App’x 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished); then citing Torp v. United States, No. 21-1422, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 2824, at *5-6 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2022) (unpublished); and then citing Bovard v. U.S. Post Off., No. 94-6360, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3846, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 1995)

(unpublished)). The court also cited several district court decisions reaching the same conclusion. Id. at PageID # 90-92 (citing cases). The court stressed that plaintiffs offered “no reason to depart from this well-established authority.” Id. at PageID

# 92.

As the court explained, plaintiffs do not “contest[] that their complaint is about the Postal Service’s mail delivery.” Id. at PageID # 92-93 (citing Pls.’ Opp’n, R.17, PageID # 70). Plaintiffs conceded “that Congress has created a statutory scheme and

a process for considering matters covered by the statutory scheme” and instead

argued that a constitutional claim (like the equal protection claim asserted here) is not subject to the Postal Regulatory Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction. Pls.’ Opp’n, R.17, PageID # 74. The district court rejected that argument, explaining that “[c]omplaints of ‘unreasonable discrimination’ by the Postal Service and of ‘undue and unreasonable preferences’ are considered service complaints and thus are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the [Commission].” Op., R.21, PageID # 90 (citing

39 U.S.C. § 403(c)). The court recognized that the substance of plaintiffs’ claim, not the label they attached to it, was dispositive, and concluded that “Plaintiffs cannot ‘avoid the [Commission’s] exclusive jurisdiction over commonplace service complaints through artful pleading.’” Id. PageID # 93 (quoting LeMay, 450 F.3d

at 801).

Having concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims, the district court made clear that it was “not adjudicat[ing] the merits of the underlying complaint.” Op., R.21, PageID # 94. The court accordingly dismissed the complaint without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Id.; J., R.22, PageID # 96. This timely appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice because it asserts that the United States Postal Service has engaged in discrimination among users of the mails in providing services. Given the frequency with which such

complaints can arise, Congress established an exclusive administrative scheme to

adjudicate them, with the goal of preventing the federal courts from being inundated with claims related to mail service. Any interested person who believes the Postal Service is discriminating in mail services may lodge a complaint with the Postal Regulatory Commission, 39 U.S.C. §§ 403(c), 3662(a), with judicial review available in the D.C. Circuit, id. § 3663.

Plaintiffs cannot bypass the exclusive scheme Congress established to review claims of discrimination in mail service by characterizing their allegations as a claim under the Equal Protection Clause for “class of one” discrimination. The Postal Regulatory Commission has jurisdiction to adjudicate all complaints about discrimination in mail services, even when framed in constitutional terms, and numerous courts have held that this exclusive scheme forecloses district court jurisdiction over such claims. Indeed, in Torp v. United States, No. 21-1422, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 2824 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2022) (unpublished), this Court rejected similar efforts by a plaintiff to avoid the exclusive scheme Congress established by asserting constitutional claims, concluding that plaintiff’s suit “is fundamentally a service-related complaint.” Id. at *5-7 (quotation marks omitted). Although that decision is unpublished, it is persuasive and consistent with the views of every other appellate court to consider these issues. The district court properly recognized this judicial consensus and noted that plaintiffs had provided “no reason to depart from this well-established authority.” Op., R.21, PageID # 92.

Application of the Supreme Court’s framework for determining when a comprehensive administrative scheme divests district courts of jurisdiction over a particular type of claim underscores the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims here. Specifically, each of the factors set forth in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1994), strongly supports the judgment below. First, meaningful judicial review is available to plaintiffs, who may lodge a complaint alleging discrimination in mail services under 39 U.S.C. § 403(c) with the Postal Regulatory Commission, with appellate review available in the D.C. Circuit. Second, plaintiffs’ equal protection claim is not wholly collateral to the Commission’s purview but rather is a typical claim of discrimination in mail services of the sort that the Commission routinely reviews. Third, the Commission has significant expertise adjudicating claims alleging that the Postal Service has discriminated in the provision of mail services. In short, all three Thunder Basin factors support the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claim of discrimination in mail services.

None of plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary has any merit. Plaintiffs make no attempt to distinguish the many decisions the district court relied upon, including this Court’s decision in Torp, holding that district courts lack jurisdiction over claims of discrimination in mail service, and they have thus forfeited any argument on that score. And, while plaintiffs note that some Supreme Court Justices have expressed

concerns about the Thunder Basin framework, they acknowledge, as they must, that it

remains the controlling test for implied preemption of district court jurisdiction. Plaintiffs err in applying that framework, however, because “meaningful review” of their claims is plainly available before the Postal Regulatory Commission and through subsequent review in the D.C. Circuit. Finally, plaintiffs’ contention that the district court improperly adjudicated their equal protection claim on the merits is simply wrong; the court expressly stated that it was not ruling on the merits, and it dismissed plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice. This Court should affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews de novo the district court’s order granting the government’s motion to dismiss. Susselman v. Washtenaw Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 109 F.4th 864, 870 (6th Cir. 2024).

ARGUMENT

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM ALLEGING DISCRIMINATION IN MAIL SERVICES FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER SUCH CLAIMS

The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice because it asserts that the United States Postal Service has engaged in “undue or unreasonable discrimination among users of the mails” “[i]n providing services.”

39 U.S.C. § 403(c). Congress established that any interested person “who believes the Postal Service is not operating in conformance with the requirements” of

§ “403(c)”—prohibiting discrimination in mail services—may lodge their complaint

with the Postal Regulatory Commission, id. § 3662(a), with judicial review available in the D.C. Circuit, id. § 3663. As this Court recognized in Torp, plaintiffs cannot, through artful pleading, circumvent the exclusive scheme that Congress created to adjudicate such claims.

A.            District Courts Lack Jurisdiction over Claims Concerning Discrimination in Mail Services.

Complaints regarding discrimination in mail services must be brought before the Postal Regulatory Commission in the first instance. The parties agree (Br. 15) that statutory claims pertaining to discrimination in mail services must be raised before the Commission, not in district court. As this Court noted just a few years ago, “all other courts have held” that the “specific grant of jurisdiction [in 39 U.S.C. § 3662] trumps the [district courts’] general jurisdictional grants.” Torp v. United States, No. 21-1422, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 2824, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2022) (unpublished). “The placement of judicial review in a particular court of appeals further compels the lack of jurisdiction in the district court.” Id. (citing Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Tr. Co., 379 U.S. 411, 419-23 (1965)); see also Axon Enter., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 598 U.S. 175, 186 (2023); 39 U.S.C. § 3663. In short, Congress displaced the general grant of jurisdiction to district courts through specific statutes providing for review of claims concerning discrimination in mail services by the Commission,

39 U.S.C. § 3662(a), and the D.C. Circuit, id. § 3663.

This divestiture of jurisdiction applies equally to claims concerning discrimination in mail services framed as constitutional claims. As this Court explained in Torp, plaintiffs cannot bypass the jurisdiction of the Postal Regulatory Commission merely by putting a constitutional label on their discrimination claim. See Torp, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 2824, at *6-7. In Torp, the plaintiff challenged the Postal Service’s decision to stop allowing the plaintiff to use its general delivery service, which “permits a person to receive mail addressed merely to his or her name, with the designation ‘General Delivery, [City Name].’” Id. at *1 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff alleged that the Postal Service’s decision violated federal civil-rights statutes, various other statutory provisions, and the U.S. Constitution. Id. at *2. But this Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that the district court had jurisdiction to hear any of those claims. As the Court explained, regardless of the specific causes of action brought, the plaintiff “wants his mail delivered one way and the Defendants have refused to do so,” which “is fundamentally a service-related complaint.” Id. at *6 (quotation marks omitted).

Although the plaintiff “argues that his claims are not service-related but raise constitutional issues,” his “allegations concern the defendants’ decision to end his use of general delivery service,” which “are service-related complaints that must be pursued before the [Commission].” Id. at *6-7. Accordingly, “the district court did not err in dismissing Torp’s suit” for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at *7.

Torp was not this Court’s first decision concluding that all claims alleging discrimination in mail service, including discrimination claims presented as constitutional claims, must be brought before the Postal Regulatory Commission or its predecessor. See Enterprise, Inc. v. Bolger, 774 F.2d 159, 161-62 (6th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). In Enterprise, a plaintiff challenged certain postal regulations that accorded second-class mailing privileges, which provided lower rates, only to newspapers with at least 50% paid subscribers. Id. at 160. The plaintiff argued that these regulations violated the First Amendment and the equal protection guarantees implicit in the Fifth Amendment. Id. This Court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims because the plaintiff was challenging “a mail rate or classification decision.” Id. at 161. As the Court explained, “even constitutional questions such as those asserted here should be raised initially at the agency level followed by review of the agency’s classification decision in the courts of appeals.” Id.

This Court’s prior decisions in Torp and Enterprise are consistent with decisions by every other appellate court to have considered this issue. See, e.g., Rapid Enters., LLC v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 24-4041, 2025 WL 1644543, at *2-3 (10th Cir. June 10,

2025) (unpublished); Pontefract v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, No. 23-3142, 2024 WL 5055838, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 10, 2024) (per curiam) (unpublished), petition for cert. filed, No. 25-6737 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2025); White v. U.S. Post Off., No. 23-1239, 2024 WL

2973705, at *2-3 (10th Cir. June 13, 2024) (unpublished); Foster v. Pitney Bowes Corp.,

549 F. App’x 982, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished); Erickson v. U.S.

Post Off., 250 F. App’x 757, 757-58 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished); LeMay

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 800-01 (8th Cir. 2006); Bovard v. U.S. Post Off., No. 94-6360, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3846, at *2-3 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 1995)

(unpublished).   And a straightforward application of the Thunder Basin framework for assessing whether a comprehensive administrative scheme divests district courts of jurisdiction over the types of claims Congress channeled to that scheme also demonstrates that these decisions are correct. Under Thunder Basin, the Court asks three questions. “First, could precluding district court jurisdiction ‘foreclose all meaningful judicial review’ of the claim?” Axon, 598 U.S. at 186 (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 212‑13 (1994)). “Next, is the claim ‘wholly collateral to the statute’s review provisions’?” Id. (citation modified) (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212). “And last, is the claim ‘outside the agency’s expertise’?” Id. (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 212). Here, all three factors point in the same direction: the district court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ equal protection claim alleging discrimination in mail service.

1.    There is no serious doubt that plaintiffs may obtain “meaningful judicial review” of their equal protection claim in the scheme that Congress prescribed. They can bring that claim to the Postal Regulatory Commission, with appellate review of the Commission’s decision available in the D.C. Circuit. 39 U.S.C. § 3663. As the Supreme Court recently explained in Axon, “[r]eview of agency action in a court of

appeals can alone ‘meaningfully address’ a party’s claims.” 598 U.S. at 190 (citation modified) (quoting Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215).

In any event, there is no daylight between a claim alleging discrimination in mail service under § 403(c) and plaintiffs’ claim here alleging a “class of one” equal protection violation in the provision of mail service. This case is thus even easier than Torp, which dealt with an alleged violation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 (empowering Congress to establish post offices and post roads), along with various purported statutory violations. Torp, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 2824, at *2. In an equal protection “class of one” claim, the question is whether the plaintiff “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and [whether] there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment,” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.

562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). Under § 403(c), the question is likewise whether the mail user has been “discriminat[ed]” against and whether that discrimination is “undue or unreasonable.” 39 U.S.C. § 403(c); see also GameFly, Inc. v. Postal Regul.

Comm’n, 704 F.3d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Thus, both § 403(c) and an equal protection “class of one” claim require mail users to demonstrate that they have been discriminated against and that the discrimination was unreasonable. This is the same analysis here, and meaningful judicial review of plaintiffs’ claim is available.

Although the Postal Regulatory Commission may lack jurisdiction to declare

discrimination in mail services unconstitutional—as opposed to finding a violation of 39 U.S.C. § 403(c)—this does not mean plaintiffs lack meaningful judicial review

within the scheme that Congress established. As the Supreme Court explained in Thunder Basin, even if a constitutional question could not be addressed in the relevant administrative body (there, the Merit Systems Protection Board), those “constitutional claims … can be meaningfully addressed in the Court of Appeals” on a petition for review. 510 U.S. at 215. Moreover, in Elgin v. Department of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012), the Court held that plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the Selective Service System were precluded even as it recognized that the relevant “administrative body could not decide the constitutionality of a federal law.” Id. at 17. As the Court explained, the availability of judicial review of plaintiffs’ constitutional claim in the Federal Circuit was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of Thunder Basin. The availability of judicial review of the Commission’s decisions in the D.C. Circuit,

39 U.S.C. § 3663, compels the same conclusion with respect to plaintiffs’ equal protection claim here.

2.    The second Thunder Basin factor—whether the claim is wholly collateral to the statute’s review provisions—fortifies the conclusion that district courts lack jurisdiction over claims of discrimination in mail service of the sort plaintiffs assert here. Plaintiffs’ claim that the Postal Service is discriminating against them in its provision of mail services is not “wholly collateral” to the Postal Regulatory Commission’s review provisions; to the contrary, it is precisely the kind of claim that the Commission routinely adjudicates. See, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv. v. Postal Regul. Comm’n,

747 F.3d 906, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2014); GameFly, 704 F.3d at 147-48.

The Supreme Court in Elgin explained that this Thunder Basin factor focuses not on the specific claim that plaintiffs brought but about what the specific issue “was ‘at bottom.’” Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22 (quoting Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614 (1984)).

In Elgin, the petitioners brought constitutional claims under the Equal Protection and Bill of Attainder Clauses after they were discharged from the federal government for failure to comply with the Military Selective Service Act. Id. at 6-7. The Court reasoned that the “petitioners’ constitutional claims are the vehicle by which they seek to reverse the removal decisions, to return to federal employment, and to receive

the compensation they would have earned but for the adverse employment action.” Id. at 22. “A challenge to removal is precisely the type of personnel action regularly adjudicated by the [Merit Systems Protection Board] and the Federal Circuit within the CSRA [i.e., Civil Service Reform Act] scheme.” Id. Likewise, the relief the petitioners sought was “precisely the kinds of relief that the CSRA empowers the [Merit Systems Protection Board] and the Federal Circuit to provide.” Id. “Far from a suit wholly collateral to the CSRA scheme, the case before us is a challenge to CSRA-covered employment action brought by CSRA-covered employees requesting relief that the CSRA routinely affords.” Id.

As in Elgin, plaintiffs’ equal protection claim here is “the vehicle by which they seek to reverse” the Postal Service’s decision not to deliver mail to their property line. 567 U.S. at 22. “A challenge to [discrimination in mail services] is precisely the type

of [service-related] action regularly adjudicated by the [Postal Regulatory

Commission].” Id. The relief plaintiffs seek—to remedy alleged discrimination in mail services and have mail delivered to their property line—is “precisely the kinds of relief that [39 U.S.C. §§ 3662 and 3663] empowers the [Commission] and the [D.C.] Circuit to provide.” Id. “Far from a suit wholly collateral to the [Commission] scheme, the case before us is a challenge to [discrimination in mail service] brought by [a mail user] requesting relief that the [Commission] routinely affords.” Id.

Accordingly, the second Thunder Basin factor strongly suggests that the district court lacked jurisdiction.

3.    The third Thunder Basin factor—whether the claim is outside the agency’s expertise—likewise demonstrates that the Postal Regulatory Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claim. The Commission routinely hears cases concerning discrimination in mail services under 39 U.S.C. § 403(c). See 39 U.S.C.

§ 3662(a) (identifying § 403(c) complaints as subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction); see also, e.g., U.S. Postal Serv., 747 F.3d at 907; GameFly, 704 F.3d at 147-48. In fact, the Commission hears concerns about discrimination in mail services or rates so frequently that it has regulations concerning not only how to handle complaints concerning these specific issues, 39 C.F.R. §§ 3022.1-3022.50, but also how to handle mere inquiries regarding service issues, id. §§ 3023.10-3023.12. The Commission even has a specific regulation pertaining to “complaints that concern rate or service matters that are isolated incidents affecting few mail users.” Id. § 3022.13(a).

Without acknowledging any of these statutory and regulatory provisions, plaintiffs make the extraordinary assertion (Br. 21-22) that a claim concerning discrimination in mail services is outside the Postal Regulatory Commission’s expertise. That argument is entirely unsupported, and it rests on the erroneous premise that the label they put on their claim controls over the substance. See, e.g., White, 2024 WL 2973705, at *2 (“The question, then, is whether White’s claim is properly characterized as a service-related complaint that falls within the scope of

§ 3662(a). In discerning the nature of his claim, we evaluate the substance of his allegations, not the labels attached to them.”); LeMay, 450 F.3d at 800-01 (“LeMay’s complaint is lavishly wrapped in contract clothing, but a court will not be dazzled by pretty wrappings. … The words echo contract, but the issues are classic questions of postal rates and services.” (citations omitted)). As in Elgin, plaintiffs here “overlook the many threshold questions that may accompany a constitutional claim and to which the [Commission] can apply its expertise.” 567 U.S. at 22; see also Thunder Basin,

510 U.S. at 214-15 (“Although the Commission has no particular expertise in construing statutes other than the Mine Act, we conclude that exclusive review before the Commission is appropriate since ‘agency expertise could be brought to bear on’ the statutory questions presented here.” (citation modified) (quoting Whitney, 279 U.S. at 420)).

Moreover, the Supreme Court emphasized in Elgin that an administrative

complaint “may involve other statutory … claims that the [Postal Regulatory

Commission] routinely considers, in addition to a constitutional challenge,” and the “resolution of those claims in the [plaintiffs’] favor might fully dispose of the case.” Elgin, 567 U.S. at 23. That is equally true here. If plaintiffs brought a statutory claim for discrimination in mail services, the Commission could provide all the same relief plaintiffs could obtain on an equal protection claim. Among other things, if successful, they would be entitled to an order from the Commission “to achieve compliance with the applicable requirements and to remedy the effects of any noncompliance.” 39 U.S.C. § 3662(c). The Commission may even fine the Postal Service in certain cases of deliberate noncompliance. Id. § 3662(d). Plaintiffs do not (and cannot) contend that the relief they requested on their equal protection claim could not be issued by the Commission if plaintiffs were to bring an otherwise valid service-related complaint under 39 U.S.C. § 403(c).

Indeed, if anything, the Postal Regulatory Commission has far greater expertise than the district courts in adjudicating complaints of discrimination in the provision of mail services because it sees these issues so often. In contrast, when these issues are brought before district courts, the courts routinely dismiss those complaints for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction without adjudicating the merits. See, e.g., Pontefract, 2024 WL 5055838, at *3 (affirming dismissal); Torp, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 2824,

at *7 (same); Foster, 549 F. App’x at 986 (same); LeMay, 450 F.3d at 801 (same); Pep-Wku LLC v. U.S. Postal Serv., Civ. A. No. 20-0009, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76257,

at *6 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 2020) (dismissing); Powell v. U.S. Postal Serv., Civ. A. No. 15-

12913, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12175, at *5 (D. Mass. Feb. 2, 2016) (same); Hollander v.

U.S. Postal Serv., Civ. A. No. 88-2497, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14370, at *2-3 (D. Mass.

Dec. 20, 1988) (same). Plaintiffs’ contention that their equal protection claim is beyond the expertise of the Commission is thus contrary to both the regulatory scheme itself and the Commission’s experience and expertise in handling complaints pertaining to discrimination in mail services.

Because each of the Thunder Basin factors indicates that Congress intended for complaints of discrimination in the provision of mail services to be channeled exclusively to the Postal Regulatory Commission, this Court should affirm the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ equal protection claim.

B.            Plaintiffs’ Arguments That the District Court Erred Lack Merit.

Despite the district court’s reliance on Torp and numerous other decisions, see, e.g., Op., R.21, PageID # 89-94, plaintiffs have not attempted to distinguish any of this “plethora of authority,” Pep-Wku, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76257, at *6. They have thus forfeited any argument that these cases are distinguishable or were wrongly decided. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wilkerson, 910 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Time, time, and time again, we have reminded litigants that we will treat an ‘argument’ as ‘forfeited when it was not raised in the opening brief.’” (quoting Golden

v. Commissioner, 548 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2008))). Conversely, Plaintiffs’ opening brief identified zero cases allowing similar claims against the Postal Service to proceed

in district court. These omissions are telling, and none of plaintiffs’ other arguments is meritorious.

First, to the extent plaintiffs argue that certain Justices have “vigorously argued to retire the Thunder Basin factors” (Br. 18 & n.3), it is undisputed that Thunder Basin provides the applicable framework for assessing whether a comprehensive administrative scheme for adjudicating certain types of claims displaces federal court jurisdiction. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 185 (applying Thunder Basin as recently as 2023).

Plaintiffs make no serious argument that Thunder Basin has been overruled or is otherwise inapplicable to this case. But they make no real effort to apply the Thunder Basin factors in any coherent way.

Second, plaintiffs’ suggestion (Br. 17) that meaningful judicial review is unavailable because the D.C. Circuit would not review the Postal Regulatory Commission’s order de novo fails. No court has suggested that de novo review must be available to constitute meaningful judicial review. See Sissel v. Wormuth, 77 F.4th 941, 946 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“[T]he default standard of review [of agency decisions] still is ordinary arbitrary-and-capricious review.”). Indeed, the Federal Circuit applies the same arbitrary or capricious standard of review to the Merit Systems Protection Board’s decisions addressed in Elgin as the D.C. Circuit applies to decisions of the Postal Regulatory Commission. Compare Elgin, 567 U.S. at 6, with GameFly, 704 F.3d at 148. The Supreme Court nevertheless held that the constitutional claims in Elgin

were impliedly preempted under Thunder Basin. Elgin, 567 U.S. at 22-23.

Third, plaintiffs suggest (Br. 12) that the scheme Congress established to review claims of discrimination in mail service does not provide meaningful review because the Postal Regulatory Commission may dismiss a complaint as a discretionary matter. That is wrong. The applicable statute provides that the Commission “shall, within

90 days after receiving a complaint,” either “upon a finding that such complaint raises material issues of fact or law, begin proceedings on such complaint” or “issue an order dismissing the complaint.” 39 U.S.C. § 3662(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). Plaintiffs misread the latter provision to suggest that it authorizes the Commission to dismiss any complaint it likes on a whim, but the Commission may dismiss only upon a finding that the complaint does not raise material issues of fact or law. Id. Indeed, that is why the Commission must, “with respect to any action taken under subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii), issue a written statement setting forth the bases of its determination,” id.

§ 3662(b)(1)(B), with review available in either event in the D.C. Circuit, id. § 3663; see also id. § 3662(c) (“If the Postal Regulatory Commission finds the complaint to be justified, it shall order that the Postal Service take such action as the Commission considers appropriate in order to achieve compliance with the applicable requirements and to remedy the effects of any noncompliance … .”).1 This is not discretionary.

1 Likewise, if the Commission fails to comply with the statutory timeframe, the complainant has exhausted administrative remedies and may bring a petition for review in the D.C. Circuit. 39 U.S.C. §§ 3662(b)(2), 3663.

Fourth, plaintiffs make a similar contention that review in the exclusive scheme Congress prescribed to raise service complaints against the Postal Service is inadequate because the Commission itself is “cryptic” or “superficial.” Br. 19. That argument also misses the mark. Plaintiffs confuse mere examples of remedies available to the Commission as being the exclusive remedies available. See Br. 14-15; see also 39 U.S.C. § 3662(c) (authorizing the Commission “to remedy the effects of any noncompliance” and then listing examples in a “such as” parenthetical that pertain to unlawful rate complaints); GameFly, 704 F.3d at 149 (“When, as in this case, the Commission properly finds that discrimination has occurred, it is obligated to remedy that discrimination … .”). Congress created a scheme in which the Commission is authorized to “remedy the effects of any noncompliance.” 39 U.S.C. § 3662(c). The Commission is not a superficial entity but rather is a complex and “independent establishment of the executive branch.” Id. § 501.

Fifth, plaintiffs’ reliance on Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), and Axon is misplaced because those cases involved structural challenges to the comprehensive schemes Congress established, which the Supreme Court held it would be pointless to channel through the relevant schemes. In Free Enterprise, the petitioners objected to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s very “existence” due to the multilevel protection from presidential removal granted to the Board’s members. Id. at 484, 490. That was a structural claim

attacking the Board in its entirety. Likewise, in Axon, the petitioners were challenging

the Federal Trade Commission’s and Securities and Exchange Commission’s “power to proceed at all, rather than actions taken in the agency proceedings.” 598 U.S.

at 192. The Axon petitioners were challenging whether “the agencies’ administrative law judges … are insufficiently accountable to the President, in violation of separation-of-powers principles,” a structural claim not a claim about any particular proceeding. Id. at 180. In contrast, plaintiffs here bring no structural challenge to the Postal Regulatory Commission; rather, they seek to litigate a routine claim pertaining to alleged discrimination in mail services on a particular narrow, one-lane road. That is precisely the type of claim that 39 U.S.C. §§ 403(c) and 3662 channel exclusively to the Postal Regulatory Commission, and the type of claim that numerous courts have recognized that district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain. See, e.g., White, 2024 WL 2973705, at *2-3; Torp, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 2824, at *5-7, LeMay, 450 F.3d at 800-

01.

Finally, plaintiffs briefly contend (Br. 28) that the district court erred by ruling on the merits of their equal protection claim after concluding that it lacked jurisdiction. That is incorrect. Plaintiffs do not identify any part of the court’s decision that could plausibly be viewed as a ruling on the merits, but they insist that the court “concluded, in so many words,” Br. 28, that they had failed to state a claim. That is the opposite of what the district court’s opinion says. The court expressly stated “that its dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint will be WITHOUT

PREJUDICE because it does not adjudicate the merits of the underlying complaint.”

Op., R.21, PageID # 94 (emphasis in original); see also J., R.22, PageID # 96 (“DISMISSED without prejudice”). A dismissal without prejudice is not a ruling on the merits. Plaintiffs chose not to file an amended complaint, but they may not now complain that the district court ruled against them on the merits.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

BRETT A. SHUMATE

Assistant Attorney General

DOMINICK S. GERACE II

United States Attorney

CHARLES W. SCARBOROUGH

 s/ Douglas C. Dreier                  

DOUGLAS C. DREIER

Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7264

U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530

(202) 514-4452

douglas.c.dreier@usdoj.gov

April 2026

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This brief complies with the type-volume limit of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) because it contains 6,844 words. This brief also complies with the typeface and type-style requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(5)-(6) because it was prepared using Word for Microsoft 365 in Garamond 14‑point font, a proportionally spaced typeface.

 s/ Douglas C. Dreier                                                           

DOUGLAS C. DREIER